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We analyze theoretically and empirically the implications of information asymmetry for
equilibrium asset pricing and portfolio choice. In our partially revealing dynamic rational
expectations equilibrium, portfolio separation fails, and indexing is not optimal. We show
how uninformed investors should structure their portfolios, using the information contained
in prices to cope with winner’s curse problems. We implement empirically this price-
contingent portfolio strategy. Consistent with our theory, the strategy outperforms eco-
nomically and statistically the index. While momentum can arise in the model, in the data,
the momentum strategy does not outperform the price-contingent strategy, as predicted by
the theory. (JEL G11, G12, G14, D53)
The theory of financial markets under homogeneous information has generated
a rich body of predictions, extensively used in the financial industry, such as the
optimality of indexing, the restrictions imposed by absence of arbitrage, and
equilibrium-based pricing relations. In contrast, the theory of capital markets
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under asymmetric information has not been used much to guide asset pricing
and portfolio allocation decisions.
The goal of the present article is to derive some of the implications of
partially revealing rational expectations equilibria for asset pricing and asset
allocation and to test their empirical relevance. We analyze an overlapping
generations multi-asset economy, in line with the seminal paper of Admati
(1985) and its extension to the dynamic case by Watanabe (2005). Agents live
for one period and trade in the market for N risky securities, generating cash
flows at each period. Some investors have private information about the future
cash flows, while others are uninformed. Revelation is only partial because the
demand of informed investors reflects their random endowment shocks, along
with their signals. Equilibrium prices are identical to those that would obtain in
a representative agent economy where (i) the market portfolio would be equal
to the supply of securities augmented by the aggregate risky endowment shock
and (ii) the beliefs of the representative agent would be a weighted average of
the informed and uninformed agents’ beliefs. This pricing relation cannot be
directly relied upon in the econometrics since the beliefs of the representative
agent are not observable by the econometrician. Hence, to test our model, we
instead focus on portfolio choice.
We show that portfolio separation does not obtain, as investors hold dif-
ferent portfolios, reflecting their different information sets. Compared to the
portfolio of aggregate risks, uninformed agents invest more in assets about
which they are more optimistic than the informed agents. To cope with this
winner’s curse problem, the uninformed agents optimally extract information
from prices. Thus they hold the optimal price-contingent portfolio, that is, the
portfolio that is mean–variance efficient conditional upon the information re-
vealed by prices. This enables uninformed agents without endowment shocks
to outperform the index. The agents with endowment shocks are willing to pay
a premium to hedge their risk. Outperformance reflects the reward to providing
insurance against this risk while optimally extracting information from prices.
The information set of the econometrician is comparable to that of unin-
formed agents with no endowment shocks. To confront our model to the data,
we empirically implement the optimal price-contingent strategy of the unin-
formed agents. We test the key implication from our theory that this portfo-
lio outperforms the index. We use monthly U.S. stock data over the period
1927–2000. We extract the information contained in prices by projecting re-
turns onto (relative) prices. We use the corresponding expected returns and
variance–covariance matrix to construct the conditional mean–variance opti-
mal portfolio of the uninformed agent. We then compare the performance of
this portfolio, as measured by its Sharpe ratio, to that of the value-weighted
CRSP index. We find that the optimal price-contingent portfolio outperforms
the index, both economically and statistically.
The optimal price-contingent portfolio allocation strategy we analyze is en-
tirely based on ex ante information. Portfolio decisions made at the beginning
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of month t rely on price and return data prior to month t . Thus, we only use
information available to market participants when they chose their portfolios.
Hence, our result that the optimal price-contingent allocation strategy outper-
forms the index differs from the findings of Fama and French (1996). They
show that, based on return means, variances, and covariances estimated as
empirical moments over a period, including month t as well as later months, an
optimal combination of their “factor portfolios” outperforms the index. How-
ever, Cooper, Gutierrez, and Marcum (2005) show that if one estimates these
empirical moments using only information prior to month t , the outperfor-
mance of the value or size strategy becomes insignificant.
To construct our price-contingent investment portfolio, we use relative
prices. The latter are correlated with past returns, on which momentum strate-
gies rely.1 We show that momentum can arise as a feature of the rational expec-
tations equilibrium price process. The performance of momentum strategies
would lead to a rejection of this theory only if it exceeded the performance of
our price-contingent strategy. Empirically, we find that the momentum strategy
does not outperform the price-contingent strategy. In addition, the correlation
structure on which our price-contingent strategy is based is more complex than
the positive serial correlation corresponding to momentum. The correlations
we empirically estimate and use in our price-contingent strategies have vari-
able signs. This is consistent with our theoretical framework. Similarly, in the
multi-asset rational expectations equilibrium analyzed by Admati (1985), the
correlation between prices and subsequent returns can be positive, negative, or
insignificant.
To illustrate our theoretical findings, we perform a numerical analysis and
simulation of the equilibrium price dynamics. This exercise highlights the
implementability of our noisy rational expectations analytic framework and
illustrates how momentum effects can arise in equilibrium.
Our noisy rational expectations model is directly in the line of the insightful
theoretical analysis of Watanabe (2005), who extends the overlapping genera-
tions model of Spiegel (1998) to the asymmetric information case. While the
structure of our model is similar to his, our focus differs. Watanabe (2005)
analyzes the effect of asymmetric information and supply shocks on return
volatility and trading volume. In particular, he shows that trading volume has
a hump-shaped relation with information precision and is positively correlated
with absolute price changes. He also shows how private information accuracy
can increase volatility. We do not focus on trading volume or volatility and
instead tackle other issues, for example, is there a CAPM return relation and is
indexing optimal under information asymmetry? Moreover, while the analysis
of Watanabe (2005) is theoretical, an important contribution of our article is to
confront the data with the empirical implications of the theory.
1 See, for example, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) and Lewellen (2002).
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Our model is also related to the theoretical analysis of Brennan and Cao
(1997). In their finite horizon model, they obtain that the optimal demand of
each agent at each point in time is the same as if there were no further trad-
ing opportunities. Thus, given past information, the equilibrium at each point
in time has the same structure as in the one-period case analyzed by Admati
(1985). In contrast, in our infinite horizon model, the equilibrium at each point
in time differs from the equilibrium of the one-period model. Expectations
about future prices influence the decisions of the traders and hence the current
price.2 Thus there are two rational expectations loops: On the one hand, agents
have rational expectations about the link between the current signals and the
current price, as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Admati (1985), and Brennan
and Cao (1997). On the other hand, there is also a link between the current
price and the next period’s price function, as in the seminal analysis of Lucas
(1978).3 These two rational expectations loops are also at play in Wang (1993).
The main differences between our analysis and his are that we analyze the
multi-asset case and we consider an overlapping generations model. Also, our
model is designed to set the stage for our econometric analysis, while his analy-
sis is purely theoretical. Several papers have analyzed empirical applications
of the noisy rational expectations framework. Cho and Krishnan (2000) esti-
mate the primitive parameters of the Hellwig (1980) single risky asset model.
Brennan and Cao (1997) and Grundy and Kim (2002) study the implications
of partially revealing rational expectations equilibria for international invest-
ment flows and volatility, respectively. Our analysis differs from these because
we focus on the empirical implications of the theory for the performance of
various portfolio strategies.
The next section presents our theoretical model. Our econometric approach
is discussed in Section 2. The empirical results are in Section 3. Section 4
concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
1. Multi-Asset Dynamic Rational Expectations Equilibrium
1.1 Assumptions
1.1.1 The sequence of events. Consider the following overlapping genera-
tions model. Agents participate in the market during two consecutive periods.
They have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utilities with risk aversion
parameter γ . There are N risky assets, each generating a stream of cash flows
at time t = 0, 1, ..,∞.
2 Another difference is that finite horizon models are nonstationary, while we analyze stationary price equilibrium
functions.
3 There also is a similar rational expectations loop in Spiegel (1998). In that overlapping generations model, prices
change because of supply shocks and public information, but there are no private signals.
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In period t: Generation t enters the market at the beginning of the period.
There is a mass one continuum of competitive agents a ∈ [0, 1]. Each agent
receives cash K at this point in time. Each agent a will also receive a state-
contingent endowment eta at time t + 1, which includes labor income and rev-
enue from other assets than stocks. Furthermore, agent a observes signal yta ,
about next period’s payoff. After privately observing signals, agents trade qta
at price pt . Market clearing requires that the new generation (t) buy the entire
supply of tradeable assets (denoted x) from the previous generation (t − 1).
In period t + 1: At the beginning of the period, the vector of asset pay-
offs ( f t+1) and the state-contingent endowments of the consumption good are
realized and distributed. Cash flows and aggregate endowments are publicly
observed. Then, generation t sells its holdings at price pt+1. Before leaving
the market, they consume their wealth:
W ta = qta ′( f t+1 + pt+1) + (K − qta ′ pta)(1 + r) + eta,
where r is the exogenous risk-free rate.
From the perspective of agent a at time t , eta and f t+1 + pt+1are two ran-
dom variables. To analyze the distribution of the final wealth of the agent at
time t + 1, we need to consider the joint distribution of these two random vari-
ables. To do this, it is convenient to project eta onto f t+1 + pt+1
eta = (zta)
′
( f t+1 + pt+1) + ηt+1a ,
where E(ηt+1a | f t+1 + pt+1) = 0. This equation is simply a statistical repre-
sentation and does not rely on any economic assumption about prices, cash
flows, and/or endowments.4 Yet, it can be given an economic interpretation.
The regression coefficient, zta , measures the sensitivity of the endowment
shocks to the risky assets’ returns. ηt+1a corresponds to the component of the
shock that is not spanned by the risky assets. When receiving her endowment
at time t , agent a does not know what the future prices and cash flows or the
noise term (ηt+1a ) will be. On the other hand, she knows the probabilistic struc-
ture of her random endowment and observes zta at time t . As will be apparent
below, because we assume that it is uncorrelated with the other random vari-
ables in the model, ηt+1a does not affect the decisions of the agents. In contrast,
zta does. Hence, we will hereafter (somewhat loosely) refer to zta as the endow-
ment shock of the agent.5 Summarizing the above discussions, the sequence of
events is depicted in Figure 1.
4 Investors can perform the projection because they know the parameters of the cash flows, endowment processes,
as well as the pricing equation.
5 Our modeling and interpretation of state-contingent endowment shocks differs slightly from that of Watanabe
(2005). In our analysis, zta is the sensitivity of personal income to risky asset returns. Watanabe (2005) models
shocks in the supply of risky assets. In terms of theoretical modeling, there is no significant mathematical dif-
ference between the two approaches. But our interpretation emphasizes the difference between tradeable risky
assets and aggregate risk exposure. This matters for the interpretation of our theoretical and empirical results.
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Figure 1
Timeline
Sequence of events in the theoretical model.
1.1.2 Informed and uninformed agents. A fraction λ of the agents has
observed a private signal about the payoff of the asset at the next period. The
other agents are uninformed. In general, all agents could receive endowment
shocks. To reduce the notational and computational burden, we consider a
simpler case. We assume that only the informed agents have endowment
shocks, that is, for the uninformed zta = 0. Random endowment shocks for
the informed agents are needed to prevent prices from being fully revealing.
To further simplify the analysis, we assume that the informed agents all
observe the same signal: yt = f t+1 + t . One should bear in mind that these
restrictions are made only for the sake of simplicity. We checked that in a
more complicated model, where uninformed agents could receive endowment
shocks, qualitatively similar results obtain.6 The econometric implications of
our analysis that we examine in the next sections are not affected by these
simplifying assumptions.
One advantage of the theoretical framework we develop here is that it is
in line with the empirical approach taken in the following sections. The unin-
formed agents in the theoretical model solve the same problem as the econo-
metrician in the empirical analysis in the next section.
The aggregate endowment shock at time t is zt . The endowment shock of
the informed agent indexed by a is zta = z
t+ζ ta
λ
, where the ζ ta are i.i.d. across
agents. The law of large numbers writes as∫
a∈S
ztada = zt ,
where S is the set of informed agents. We assume that zt follows an autore-
gressive process
zt = ρz zt−1 + tz, (1)
6 Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2005) extend our analysis. They study portfolio implications of particular
types of information heterogeneity. Their approach is static, however, as in Admati’s original model.
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where z is white noise, with variance σ 2z , and ρz is a coefficient matrix with
eigenvalues strictly less than one, so that z is stationary.
Since all the informed agents observe the same signal, they do not need to
filter out information from the price. Hence they do not need to form beliefs
about the shocks of the others. The uninformed agents, in contrast, need to
infer information from prices. In doing this, however, they do not need to be
concerned about the distributions of the individual shocks. In equilibrium, only
the aggregate shock (zt ) matters for them. Finally, note that our assumption that
uninformed agents have no endowment shock simplifies the analysis, since it
rules out inferences about zt from their own shock.
We assume that the cash flows generated by the risky assets at each period
follow an autoregressive process
f t+1 = μ + ρ f f t + tf , (2)
where  f is white noise with variance σ 2f , μ is a non-negative constant, and ρ f
is such that f is stationary.
The private signals are equal to the realization of the cash flow plus a noise
term:
yt = f t+1 + t .
The variance of t is denoted by σ 2. All the random variables are assumed to
be jointly normal.
1.2 Analysis
1.2.1 Prices and demand. We look for a stationary linear rational expecta-
tions price function:
pt = A f t + Byt − Czt − Dzt−1 + G. (3)
Imposing this stationary form, where the coefficients are time-independent,
rules out bubbles (which are nonstationary). The price function in Equation (3)
is similar to the equilibrium price function in Equation (3) in Admati (1985).
The main difference is that in Admati (1985), the equilibrium price is a func-
tion of only two variables, the final cash flow and the current supply shock,
while in the present model, it is also a function of the prior cash flow and the
prior shock. In our dynamic analysis, it is necessary to include these two addi-
tional variables to summarize the past of the process. Note however that in the
simple environment we consider, it is enough to include only the prior cash
flow and the prior shock. Previous realizations of the variables do not enter the
equilibrium price function. This differs from Wang (1993) and Brennan and
Cao (1997), where the entire past history entered the price function. Our price
equation is similar to that obtained by Watanabe (2005), up to some minor
differences reflecting alternative modeling choices. For example, like Admati
1509
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(1985), Watanabe (2005) assumes that all agents observe private signals with
independent errors. By the law of large numbers, their errors integrate out.
Hence, in his analysis, the price is a function of the realized cash flow. This
differs from our analysis where there is only one private signal.
The final wealth of agent a can be rewritten as
W ta = (qta + zta)′( f t+1 + pt+1) + (K − qta ′ pta)(1 + r) + ηt+1a .
Because of linearity, conditionally on the price, all the random variables are
jointly normal. Thus, with CARA utilities, the program of agent a at time t is
Maxqta E[W ta |I ta] −
γ
2
V ar [W ta |I ta],
where I ta is the information set of agent a at time t . That is,
Maxqta E
[
(qta + zta)′( f t+1 + pt+1) − qta ′ pt (1 + r) + ηt+1a |I ta
]
− γ
2
{
V ar
[
(qta + zta)′( f t+1 + pt+1)|I ta
]+ V ar(ηt+1a )}. (4)
All expectations and variances are taken conditionally upon the information
set of the agent at the beginning of period t , including in particular the pub-
licly observed variables: f t and zt−1. For brevity, we hereafter omit writing
these variables explicitly in the conditioning set. The optimal demand of the
informed agents is
1
γ
(
V ar [ f t+1 + pt+1|yt ]
)−1 {
E[ f t+1 + pt+1|yt ] − pt (1 + r)
}
− zta .
V ar [ f t+1 + pt+1|yt ] is constant over time because of the linearity and sta-
tionarity of the pricing function and the joint normality of the variables. The
inverse of this matrix is τy , the precision of the information of the informed
agents. The demand of the informed agents is written as
τy
γ
{
E[ f t+1 + pt+1|yt ] − pt (1 + r)
}
− zta .
This demand reflects the endowment shock zta , as agents seek to trade away
from their undiversified endowments, to hold more balanced portfolios. For
example, consider an agent working for Exxon, whose income and wealth are
exposed to the risk of this firm and, more generally, to the oil industry. This
agent will form his optimal portfolio taking into account his exposure to this
firm and industry.
The demand of the uninformed agent is(
γ V ar [ f t+1 + pt+1|pt ]
)−1 {
E[ f t+1 + pt+1|pt ] − pt (1 + r)
}
.
That is,
τp
γ
{
E[ f t+1 + pt+1|pt ] − pt (1 + r)
}
, (5)
1510
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where τp denotes the precision of the information set of the uninformed agents.
Importantly, this information set includes the current price. Equation (5) shows
that, as discussed in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), the demand of the unin-
formed agent is contingent on prices, not only because of the standard effect
of price on demand but also because of the expectation of future cash flows,
and their variance is conditional on prices. Hereafter, we refer to this demand
as the “optimal price-contingent strategy.”
1.2.2 Equilibrium. Market clearing implies:
λτy[E[ f t+1 + pt+1|yt ] − pt (1 + r)] + (1 − λ)τp[E[ f t+1 + pt+1|pt ]
− pt (1 + r)] = γ (x + zt ).
This yields the market-clearing price:
pt = ωE[ f
t+1+ pt+1|yt ]+(I −ω)E[ f t+1+ pt+1|pt ]−γ (λτy +(1−λ)τp)−1(x+zt )
1+r ,
(6)
where the constant ω is such that
ω = (λτy + (1 − λ)τp)−1λτy,
and I is the identity matrix. Defining the average expectation as
Em[ f t+1 + pt+1] = ωE[ f t+1 + pt+1|yt ] + (1 − ω)E[ f t+1 + pt+1|pt ],
and the average variance–covariance matrix as
m = (λτy + (1 − λ)τp)−1,
one obtains the pricing relation stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If there exists a stationary linear rational expectations equilib-
rium, prices are such that
pt = 1
1 + r {E
m[ f t+1 + pt+1] − γm(x + zt )}. (7)
Equation (7) essentially tells us that the portfolio of aggregate risk, x + zt , is
mean–variance optimal for the average expectations vector Em[ f t+1 + pt+1]
and variance–covariance matrix m . Otherwise stated, equilibrium prices
are identical to those that would obtain in a homogeneous information-
representative agent economy, where the market portfolio would be equal to
the supply of securities (x) augmented by the aggregate risky endowment (zt )
and the representative agent would have the average beliefs Em and m . A
CAPM return–covariance relationship holds, from the perspective of the rep-
resentative agent, relative to this augmented portfolio (x + zt ), which differs
1511
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from the index (x). After standard manipulations, Equation (7) yields the clas-
sic CAPM equilibrium return equation, for our representative agent economy
Em(r t+1i ) − r = β ti (Em(r t+1m ) − r),
where r t+1i = (pt+1i + f t+1i − pti )/pti is the return on asset i , r t+1m =∑N
j=1(xi + ztj )r t+1j is the return on the portfolio of aggregate risks, expec-
tations are taken from the point of view of the representative investor’s average
belief, and β ti is defined as
β ti =
Cov(r t+1i , r t+1m |zt )
V ar(r t+1m |zt )
.
At time t , the representative agent knows zt . But through time, zt follows a
stochastic process. Hence betas are stochastically evolving.
This pricing relation cannot be directly relied upon in the econometrics to
estimate a representative agent model, however. Indeed, the beliefs of the rep-
resentative agent are not observable by the econometrician. Nor is the portfolio
of aggregate risk (x + z) observable, a point that is related to the Roll (1977)
Critique.7 Thus we take another route to confront our model to the data, as
explained in the next section.
The aggregation result we obtain in our dynamic rational expectation
equilibrium context is related to previous results obtained in static models, but
it also differs from them. First, the pricing equation, Equation (7), differs from
that stated in Corollary 3.5 in Admati (1985). Admati characterizes the ex ante
expected price, computed by averaging across all realizations of the random
variables. She shows that an aggregate CAPM obtains on average across pos-
sible realizations of the random variables. This contrasts with the equilibrium
relationship (7) obtained in the present article, which holds in every possible
state of the world. Second, as in Mayers (1974), investor’s risk exposure and
hence market pricing are affected by the nontradeable endowment shocks.
Third, our aggregation result with heterogeneous beliefs reflects in part
our assumption that agents have exponential utility. This is in line with the
Gorman aggregation results obtained by Wilson (1968) (see also Huang
and Litzenberger 1988, pp. 146–148, and Lintner 1969). In these analyses,
however, beliefs are exogenous and inconsistent with rational expectations. In
ours, aggregation obtains with endogenous beliefs and rational expectations.
Fourth, DeMarzo and Skiadas (1998) also offer a theoretical analysis of a
CAPM with heterogeneous information, but our model differs from theirs.
On the one hand, they allow for a more general class of utility functions than
7 In the Roll Critique, the econometrician cannot observe the market portfolio. In our analysis, the econometrician
and the uninformed agents cannot observe the portfolio of aggregate risk. While in the original Roll Critique
lack of observability has statistical consequences only, in our analysis, it also has economic consequences, as
it precludes full revelation of the private signals. That is, the Roll Critique states that the CAPM can be tested
in principle, but not in practice; if our model of partial revelation is true, then the CAPM-like pricing equation
cannot even be tested in principle.
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we do. On the other hand, a key ingredient in our model is that the aggregate
portfolio of risks is unknown by the uninformed agents, which prevents
prices from being fully informative. In contrast, the CAPM result obtained
by DeMarzo and Skiadas (1998) reflects their assumption that the aggregate
supply of each of the risky assets is common knowledge for all the agents.8
Finally, O’Hara (2003) also focuses on the impact of asymmetric information
on portfolio choice and asset pricing in the Grossman and Stiglitz framework.
Our dynamic analysis differs from the static model of O’Hara (2003).
Simple manipulations of the market-clearing condition (6) yield
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. If there exists a stationary linear rational expectations equilib-
rium, the demand of the uninformed agent is
(x + zt ) + λ
γ
[τp
{
E[ f t+1 + pt+1|pt ] − pt (1 + r)}
− τy
{
E[ f t+1 + pt+1|yt ] − pt (1 + r)}].
The demand of the uninformed agent is equal to the portfolio of aggregate
risk, x + zt , which she would hold if information was homogeneous, minus a
correction term. The latter underscores the winner’s curse problem faced by
the uninformed agent. She invests more than the aggregate portfolio in asset i
when she is more optimistic about this asset than the informed agent, while she
invests less otherwise. Hence, portfolio separation does not obtain in our asym-
metric information environment. Different agents hold different portfolios, to
the extent that they have different information sets.9
In contrast with the homogeneous information case, the uninformed agent
does not buy the portfolio of aggregate risk (x + z). She does not do so inten-
tionally, because she does not know this portfolio. However, she invests
optimally given the information she observes, which includes in particular the
current prices. Thus the portfolio she holds outperforms the index. One might
wonder how uninformed agents can obtain such superior performance. It arises
because the agents with endowment shocks are willing to pay a premium to
hedge their risk. Thus, the performance obtained by the uninformed agents
reflects the price other agents are willing to pay for insurance.
Since the uninformed agent does not know the structure of the portfolio of
aggregate risk, her deviation from this portfolio can be interpreted as estima-
tion risk. In the past (e.g., Kandel and Stambaugh 1996), estimation risk has
8 Proposition 6 in DeMarzo and Skiadas (1998) establishes that a CAPM holds in equilibrium. They assume that
the endowment of agent i is ei = ai + bi V , where V is the value of the asset, and ai and bi are coefficients such
that a = ∑i ai and b = ∑i bi are common knowledge to all the agents (see Definition 4, pp. 138 and 139).
Hence, in this economy, the aggregate endowment of the risky assets is common knowledge.
9 This contrasts with a two-fund separation result obtained by DeMarzo and Skiadas (1998) under the assumption
that the aggregate supply of risky assets is common knowledge.
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been studied under homogeneous information, in which case it only adds to
variance. In our asymmetric information setting, estimation risk also yields a
winner’s curse. Consequently, our analysis introduces a new dimension to the
nature of estimation risk.
Computing explicitly the demand functions of the informed and uninformed
agents and equating the price relation obtained from the market-clearing con-
dition with the conjectured price function (3), we obtain the next proposition:
Proposition 3. There exists a linear stationary rational expectations equilib-
rium, if there exists a solution B, C, D to the following system:
B = −1(λτy + (1 − λ)τp)−1λτy
× [I − (1 + r)−1ρ f ]−1V ar(tf )V ar(tf + t )−1,
C = −1γ (λτy + (1 − λ)τp)−1,
D = −1(Cρz + D)ρz + [I − (1 + r)−1]
× [[I − (1 + r)−1ρ f ]−1V ar(tf )B ′ + (Cρz + D)V ar(tz)C ′]
× (BV ar(tf + t )B ′ + CV ar(tz)C ′)−1(Cρz + D),
where , τy , and τp are functions of B, C, and D given by Equations (A4),
(A6), and (A7) in the Appendix. The two other parameters of the equilibrium
price function A and G are also functions of B, C, and D given in Equations
(A8) and (A12) in the Appendix.
The system of nonlinear equations stated in Proposition 3 is rather com-
plicated. This contrasts with the elegant closed-form solutions obtained by
Admati (1985). The additional complexity we face here stems from the
dynamic nature of the problem. The price at time t reflects the expectations
of the agents about the cash flow and the price at time t + 1. Thus, the rational
expectations loop is more complicated than in the one-period case. In the lat-
ter, agents must have rational expectations about the link between the current
price and the current signals. In the dynamic case, there is also a link between
the current price and the next period’s price function. A similar complexity
arises in the dynamic analysis of asset pricing under asymmetric information
by Wang (1993).10 Watanabe (2005) obtains a slightly closer characterization
of equilibrium than we do. This reflects alternative modeling choices. For
example, he assumes that dividends and supply shocks are random walks,
10 There is an additional complexity arising in Wang (1993), but not in the present analysis. We assume the in-
formed agents observe a signal on the next cash flow, which is then publicly observed. Wang (1993) assumes
that informed agents observe the stochastically evolving mean of the cash-flow process. Thus, the uninformed
agents must continuously learn about this state variable. Hence, to write the equilibrium price as a function of
observable variables, one would have to include the entire history of the process.
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which simplifies the computations. Our more complicated structure helps in
generating rich dynamics.
1.2.3 Special cases. In special cases, the existence and properties of equi-
librium can be analyzed explicitly. First consider the simplest case, without
endowment shocks and without private signals. In this case, market clearing
yields
pt = (1 + r)−1{E(pt+1 + f t+1) − γ τ−1x},
where τ−1 = V ar( f ). The standard dynamic CAPM obtains. All agents have
the same beliefs, and they all hold the market portfolio, that is, indexing is
optimal. In this case, there exists a unique stationary linear rational expecta-
tions equilibrium, spelled out in the next corollary.11
Corollary 1. When there are no endowment shocks and no private
signals, there exists a unique stationary, linear, rational expectation
price function, pt = A f t + G, where A = ρ f [(1 + r)I − ρ f ]−1 and G =
r−1[(I + A)μ − γ τ−1x].
The empirical asset pricing literature has documented important stylized
facts about the time series of stock returns. It has been found that returns
were predictable (see, e.g., Cochrane 1999). In particular, stocks whose return
over the past twelve months is low relative to that of others tend to under-
perform, while stocks with recent strong returns tend to outperform. Hence,
shorting the losers and investing the proceeds in recent winners generates high
expected returns. This strategy has become known as the momentum strategy.
It has been analyzed in depth by Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996).
These empirical findings have motivated theoretical analyses based on the
assumptions that some investors are irrational. Our framework offers an
opportunity to check whether momentum and predictability are consistent with
equilibrium in a dynamic CAPM where all agents are rational.12
The time t + 1 return is
Rt+1 = pt+1 + f t+1 − pt . (8)
To implement the momentum strategy, we form a portfolio investing in assets
proportional to their excess return relative to the average across all assets. This
11 This is similar to the dynamic CAPM studied by Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1978).
12 The observation in Lucas (1978) that dynamic general equilibrium may give rise to a variety of types of pre-
dictability already foreshadowed that it would be possible to generate momentum in specific cases.
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leads indeed to buying winners and selling losers. More precisely, the strategy
involves purchasing
Rti − R¯t
N
, (9)
units of asset i , where Rti is the return on this asset in period t, R¯t is the
average return (computed across assets) for period t , and N is the number of
risky assets.
The following corollary provides information about the time-series proper-
ties of returns and the profitability of this momentum strategy in the special
case of our model where a dynamic CAPM obtains. For simplicity, we fo-
cus on the case where risky assets are ex ante identical and independent and
ρ f = ρ¯ f I , where ρ¯ f ∈ [0, 1].
Corollary 2. When there are no endowment shocks and no private signals,
under our assumptions individual return autocorrelations are positive, and the
expected return on the momentum strategy is positive for large N .
In our framework, cash flows f t are positively serially correlated. The corol-
lary states that equilibrium returns will be positively correlated too. Momen-
tum and predictability arise, yet pricing is rational and indexing is optimal. As
a result, momentum and predictability cannot be relied upon to outperform the
passive strategy of holding the index. Nor do momentum and predictability
suffice to reject CAPM pricing.
Another interesting special case is when there are endowment shocks but
no private signal, that is, λ = 0, as analyzed by Spiegel (1998).13 In this case,
the standard CAPM no longer holds. The relevant measure of aggregate risk
is not the index, but the index augmented by the aggregate endowment shock.
All agents have the same beliefs and share risk equally. As shown by Spiegel
(1998), when equilibrium exists, it is generically not unique. Multiplicity arises
because of the circularity involved by the dynamic rational expectations loop:
the price function depends upon the expectation of the price function. To
illustrate this, assume for simplicity that ρz = 0. Denote V ar(z) = σ 2z I and
V ar( f ) = σ 2f I , where σ 2z and σ 2f are scalars. Manipulating the system in
Proposition 3 yields the following result:14
Corollary 3. Assume that there are no private signals (λ = 0), endowment
shocks are white noise (ρz = 0), and the risky assets are ex ante identical and
independent. If 1 + r < ρ¯ f + 2γ σ f σz , there does not exist a linear rational
13 As λ goes to 0,
∫
a∈S ztada is scaled such that in the limit zt does not go to 0.
14 We are grateful to the referee for suggesting this result and its proof.
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expectation equilibrium. In contrast, if 1 + r > ρ¯ f + 2γ σ f σz , then there exist
2N solutions to the quadratic matrix equation:
τ−1 = [1 + ρ¯ f
(1 + r) − ρ¯ f ]
2σ 2f I + [
γ
1 + r ]
2σ 2z (τ
−1)′τ−1. (10)
Each of these solutions corresponds to a linear rational expectation equi-
librium price function of the form pt = A f t − Czt + G, where A =
ρ f
(
(1 + r)I − ρ f
)−1
, C = γ1+r τ−1, and G = r−1[(I + A)μ − γ τ−1x].
In equilibrium, a variety of return dynamics can arise. Since returns reflect
cash flows ( f t ) and since the latter are persistent, there is some persistence in
returns, which can generate momentum. On the other hand, returns also include
a transient component (zt ). This can give rise to mean reversion. Depending on
parameter values, one effect or the other can dominate. Hence, momentum or
reversals can arise in our dynamic rational expectations equilibrium. This is
illustrated in the simulations presented next.
1.2.4 Numerical analysis. To illustrate the quantitatively major aspects of
our model, such as equilibrium momentum, the performance of the price-
contingent strategy, and the effect of variation in the proportion of informed
agents, we now offer a numerical analysis of the dynamic rational expectations
equilibrium. This analysis is cast in the context of the simple case characterized
in the next corollary.15
Corollary 4. Consider the case where ρz = μ = 0, N = 2, and the cash
flows and endowments of the two risky assets are ex ante identically and inde-
pendently distributed and denote
V ar( f ) =
(
σ 2f 0
0 σ 2f
)
, V ar() =
(
σ 2 0
0 σ 2
)
, and V ar(z) =
(
σ 2z 0
0 σ 2z
)
.
There exists a symmetric equilibrium where B, C , , τy , τp, and ω are sym-
metric 2 × 2 matrices, if there exists a solution b, c to the following system of
scalar equations:
b = σ
2
f λιy(λιy + (1 − λ)ιp)−1
φ(σ 2f + σ 2)(1 − ρ f (1 + r)−1)
, (11)
c = γ
φ(λιy + (1 − λ)ιp) , (12)
15 We are grateful to the referee for suggesting this result and its proof.
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where the scalars φ,w, ιy , and ιp are such that
φ = (1 + r) − σ
2
f [1 − λιy(λιy + (1 − λ)ιp)−1]b
((σ 2f + σ 2)b2 + σ 2z c2)(1 − ρ f (1 + r)−1)
, (13)
ι−1y =
σ 2f σ
2
(σ 2f + σ 2)(1 − ρ f (1 + r)−1)2
+ ((σ 2f + σ 2)b2 + σ 2z c2), (14)
ι−1p =
σ 2f [1 − b2σ 2f {(σ 2f + σ 2)b2 + σ 2z c2}]
(1 − ρ f (1 + r)−1)2 + ((σ
2
f + σ 2)b2 + σ 2z c2).
(15)
The solutions to this system, b and c and the corresponding values of φ, ιy, and
ιp, are the eigenvalues of the symmetric matrices B, C , τy,τp, and . D = 0
and A are obtained from B and C, as in Proposition 3.
To conduct our numerical analysis, we rely on Corollary 4. Thus, we focus
on symmetric equilibria.16 We discuss below the instances where results qual-
itatively differ across equilibria. Also, we focus on a set of parameters such
that 1 + r > ρ¯ f + 2γ σ f σz , so that linear equilibria exist in the symmetric in-
formation case, and we select parameters such that the momentum strategy
(as defined in the description leading to Corollary 2) can generate positive
average returns. Thus, we set ρ f = 0.990, since momentum arises when cash
flows are persistent. As discussed by Spiegel (1998, p. 436), it is plausible that
the variance of supply shocks is relatively small compared to that of cash flows.
Correspondingly, we set σ 2f = 0.100 and σ 2z = 0.010. Furthermore, we focus
on the case where informed signals are quite precise and set: σ 2 = 0.001. Note
also that we set r = 0.10, ρz = 0, and γ = 1.735 and we normalize x to 1.17
Figure 2 plots the equilibrium parameters as a function of λ, for one of
the two symmetric equilibria. For simplicity, we focus on the diagonal terms.
First note that when λ = 0, B = 0, which is a sanity check for our analysis:
when no agent in the market is privately informed, the private signal is not
revealed in prices at all. Second, note that A decreases and B increases with
λ. As λ increases, more private information gets impounded in prices and B
16 In a previous draft of the article, we also considered asymmetric equilibria. For these we could not rely on simple
equations similar to those stated in Corollary 4. To analyze this more complicated case, we relied on a numerical
method known as perturbation analysis. See Biais, Bossaerts, and Spatt (2007). Note also that the symmetric
case gives rise to multiplicity to the extent that there are multiple eigenvectors. This would no longer arise with
non-diagonal exogenous parameter matrices.
17 It is not clear what an appropriate order of magnitude should be for the coefficient of absolute risk aversion in
a CARA model. Indeed, one must bear in mind that cash does not affect choices in such a context, so that total
wealth does not show up in the equilibrium restrictions. Wang (1993) normalizes the coefficient of absolute risk
aversion to 1. We normalize the total endowment of risky assets to 1 and arbitrarily set γ to 1.735. We checked
that when one varies the value of this coefficient, equilibrium parameters change (reflecting a change in the
risk-return trade-off), but not in a dramatic way, that is, there is no local instability.
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Figure 2
Equilibrium
Estimates of price equation coefficients as a function of the proportion lambda (λ) of informed agents. Pa-
rameters: two identical risky securities with uncorrelated payoffs and signals, both in unit supply; r = 0.100;
ρ f = 0.990, ρz = 0; σ2f = 0.100, σ2z = 0.010, σ2 = 0.001; γ = 1.735.
increases.18 Correspondingly, less weight is given to the prior expectation of
cash flows (reflecting f t ) and A decreases.
For the equilibrium on which we focus, Figure 3 displays average returns
for the momentum and price-contingent portfolios, as defined in the theoretical
analysis above (see Equations (9) and (5), respectively). Estimates are based on
sixty-period average returns and five hundred random replications. Results are
shown as a function of λ, for λ ≤ 8%. The left panel shows average momentum
returns in excess of average index returns. The right panel displays the average
excess returns earned by the price-contingent strategy. Confidence intervals of
95% are depicted.
On average, the price-contingent strategy generates larger returns than the
market portfolio, thus illustrating our theoretical analysis. Of course, this also
obtains in the three other equilibria. The average return on the price-contingent
strategy goes down with λ. The source of performance for this strategy is the
supply of liquidity to agents with endowment shocks. The cost of this strat-
18 We checked that in the other symmetric equilibria, B also increases with λ. But, while C decreases with λ in the
equilibrium upon which we focus, it increases in the other symmetric equilibrium.
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Simulation Results
Estimates of sixty-period average return (in excess of the market) of the momentum portfolio (left panel) and
the optimal price-contingent portfolio of an uninformed agent without endowment shocks (right panel) as a
function of the proportion (λ) of informed agents. Vertical bars denote 95% confidence interval. Parameters:
two identical risky securities with uncorrelated payoffs and signals, both in unit supply; r = 0.100; ρ f = 0.990,
ρz = 0; σ2f = 0.100, σ2z = 0.010, σ2 = 0.001; γ = 1.735.
egy stems from trading with superiorly informed agents. When λ goes up, the
former effect remains constant, while the latter is strengthened.
In the equilibrium on which we focus, the momentum portfolio also beats the
index for λ above 5%. This shows that asymmetric information can give rise
to momentum in a dynamic noisy rational expectations equilibrium. Otherwise
stated, outperformance of the index by the momentum portfolio should not be
viewed as evidence of deviation from rational expectations. It should be noted,
however, that in the other equilibria we simulated, the momentum portfolio
did not outperform the index. Thus the excess performance of the momentum
portfolio is not a robust feature of our equilibria, in contrast with the excess
performance of the price-contingent portfolio.
2. Econometric Approach
2.1 Testable restriction implied by theory
Hansen and Singleton (1982) test whether the representative agent invests
optimally. This is not feasible in our setting, where the econometrician does
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not observe the endowment shocks and the signals necessary to construct the
representative investor. On the other hand, the information set of the econo-
metrician is similar to that of the uninformed agent in our model. The unin-
formed agent’s demand is the solution to a simple mean–variance portfolio
choice problem, where the information content of prices is used to estimate
expected returns and variances. This is the price-contingent strategy defined
in Equation (5). Our theoretical analysis implies that in the partially reveal-
ing rational expectations equilibrium, this investment strategy fares better, in
mean–variance terms, than indexing. In contrast, if the CAPM holds, then
indexing is optimal. Hence, to test the partially revealing rational expectations
equilibrium against the CAPM, we compare the performance of the index to
that of the price-contingent portfolio strategy of the uninformed agent.
We focus upon what is likely to be the most robust implication of the theory,
that is, that prices contain information, rather than on more parametric aspects
of the model. Spiegel (1998) and Watanabe (2005) show that equilibrium mul-
tiplicity arises in dynamic rational expectations equilibria. Yet, irrespective of
which equilibrium the agents in the economy select, Equation (5) still describes
the optimal investment strategy of a rational uninformed investor. This empir-
ical implication is also robust to alternative parametrizations of our model, for
example, in which some uninformed agents would be exposed to endowment
shocks or informed agents would observe various signals. While in Equation
(5), the optimal strategy involves conditioning on price levels, in our econo-
metric analysis, for statistical reasons, we will use relative prices instead.
Our comparison of the performance of the price-contingent strategy to that
of the index is in the line of empirical investigations of asset pricing models,
testing the efficiency of a particular portfolio, such as a market proxy. How-
ever, our approach differs from previous empirical results on the inefficiency
of market proxies.
First, our theory implies that indexing should be inferior to a portfolio strat-
egy constructed using public information available to the agent when he makes
his investment decision. Hence, our empirical analysis will be ex ante, that is,
to form portfolios at date t , we will use only data observed prior to t . In con-
trast, Fama and French (1996) and Davis, Fama, and French (2000) rely on
ex post information. They find that proxies of the market portfolio are mean–
variance suboptimal relative to some ex post determined combination of three
specific factor portfolios: the market proxy itself, a portfolio long in small firms
and short in large firms, and a portfolio long in value stock and short in growth
stock. Cooper, Gutierrez, and Marcum (2005) show that if one uses only infor-
mation in prior returns to determine optimal combinations, the improvement
from investing in Fama and French’s factor portfolios is insignificant.
Second, we compare indexing against a portfolio strategy based on spe-
cific information suggested by theory, namely, relative prices, as opposed to
information obtained through an exhaustive search over all available informa-
tion. Without the discipline that theory imposes, such an exercise runs into the
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danger of data snooping. Information in relative prices has never been explic-
itly conditioned on before. This information may have been implicitly condi-
tioned on in other studies, such as those evaluating momentum investment. We
discuss the difference between our price-contingent strategy and momentum
investment in the next section.
2.2 The data
We focus on monthly returns on U.S. common stock listed on the NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ, as recorded by CRSP for the period from July 1927
until December 2000. The null hypothesis is that the value-weighted CRSP
index is optimal. This index has been used as the market proxy in previous
empirical studies. Against the null hypothesis, we test the hypothesis that the
index is outperformed by the price-contingent portfolio. In principle, one can
construct those portfolios by combining individual stocks. This requires, how-
ever, that one handles thousands of different stocks, correlating their returns
to their prices, a computationally challenging exercise. A more parsimonious
approach is to use groups of stocks as building blocks for our portfolios.
A natural choice for these groups of stocks is to focus on the six portfolios
that have been used extensively in the empirical asset pricing literature. These
are specific portfolios constructed from a double sort of the securities based
on the size of the issuing firms, as well as the ratio of book value to market
value. We will refer to them as the six Fama-French (FF) benchmark portfolios.
Portfolio 1 selects stocks of large companies with a low ratio of book to market
value. Portfolio 2 also selects large companies, but with a medium book to
market value. Portfolio 3 is comprised of large value companies. Portfolios 4
to 6 are analogous to Portfolios 1 to 3, but for small firms only. All portfolios
are value-weighted. Details can be found on Ken French’s Web site.
Monthly returns are taken from Ken French’s Web site.19 We use the returns
that are adjusted for the substantial transaction costs caused by flows of indi-
vidual assets in and out of the portfolios. Such flows are the result of changes
in firm size, book, and market values.
The choice of these assets for studying the information content of prices is
suitable in light of the well-known dispersion in their relative prices over time,
enhancing the potential power of our statistical analysis. However, the size or
value strategies do not significantly outperform indexing on an ex ante basis,
as shown by Cooper, Gutierrez, and Marcum (2005). Hence, the performance
of price-contingent strategies using only ex ante information to form portfolios
of these assets cannot be due to data mining.
It is not obvious how to measure the relative prices on which our portfolio
allocation strategy will be based. We opted to use the weights in a buy-and-hold
portfolio of the six FF benchmark portfolios, reinvesting returns (including
19 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html.
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dividends) into the FF portfolio that generates them. More specifically, let r ti
denote the rate of return on FF benchmark portfolio i (i = 1, ..., 6) over month
t . (t = 1 corresponds to July 1927.) Let pti denote our measure of the relative
price of portfolio i at the beginning of month t . It is computed as follows:
pti =
pt−1i (1 + r ti )∑6
j=1 p
t−1
j (1 + r tj )
, (16)
where t > 0. Notice that
∑6
i=1 pti = 1, so our prices are effectively portfolio
weights in a portfolio of the six FF benchmark portfolios. This portfolio starts
with $1 at the end of June 1927. The initial weights used to initialize this
procedure are arbitrarily chosen, and we checked that they do not affect our
empirical results. Our proxies for relative prices are thus weights in a value-
weighted portfolio.
One could be concerned about persistence in the prices. Our portfolio
allocation strategy will be based on projections of a month’s returns onto the
vector of relative prices at the beginning of the month. The properties of esti-
mated projection coefficients are known to be unusual when the explanatory
variables exhibit persistence. In particular, the significance of the projection
coefficients may be spurious, and the outperformance of the resulting price-
contingent strategy may be a statistical artifact. To be sure that this is not the
case, it is imperative that we perform an ex ante portfolio performance evalu-
ation. As mentioned before, this is exactly what we do. If the significance of
the projection coefficients is not spurious, persistence in the regressors (rela-
tive prices) is actually a virtue. Standard least squares projection coefficients
converge faster.
2.3 Portfolio allocation strategy
The allocation strategy we implement is in line with the mean–variance
optimization described in our theoretical analysis in Equation (4), which gave
rise to the optimal price-contingent strategy given in Equation (5). For each
month in the sample, referred to as the target month, we determine the compo-
sition of the portfolio that promises the highest conditional expected return for
a volatility equal to that of the benchmark CRSP index. Thus, to determine the
portfolio qt , we solve20
Maxqt E(qt ′r t+1|pt ), s.t., V ar(qt ′r t+1|pt ) = V tindex ,
where V tindex is the conditional variance of the index as of t . Determining
this portfolio requires estimating expectations (E(qt ′r t+1|pt )) and variances
(V ar(qt ′r t+1|pt ); V tindex ).
20 In accordance with our theory and extant empirical studies, short-sale constraints are not imposed.
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In line with our theory, we estimate conditional expectations by projecting
returns onto relative prices. Variances and covariances are estimated from the
errors of these projections. To determine the optimal portfolio for any target
month, we use observations from the sixty-month period prior to the target
month. That is, our analysis is entirely ex ante, that is, only based on informa-
tion that investors had available at the beginning of the target month. Gener-
alized least squares (GLS) are used to estimate the coefficients in projections
of returns onto prices, to adjust for the substantial autocorrelation in the error
(it sufficed to adjust for first-order autocorrelation). No further adjustments
were made, although one obviously could think of many potential improve-
ments (iterated least squares, higher-order autocorrelation in the error term,
autoregressive heteroscedasticity, etc.).21
To estimate the volatility of the index V tindex , we perform GLS projections of
index returns onto the prices of the six FF benchmark portfolios over the sixty
months prior to the target months, accounting for first-order autocorrelation
in the error term. The ex ante volatility of the index return is then obtained
from the standard deviation of the prediction error of these GLS projections.
Estimating the volatility of the price-contingent portfolio is more complicated,
as discussed below.
2.4 Accounting for errors in estimating optimal portfolio weights
Because optimal weights for our price-contingent strategy are based on esti-
mated expected returns, variances, and covariances, we inevitably introduce
estimation error. When we base ex ante volatility estimates on the covariance
matrix of the prediction errors from GLS projections of returns onto prices, we
fail to properly account for estimation error. As a result, the ex post volatili-
ties may be higher. The ex post volatilities can readily be estimated as mean
squared differences between returns actually recorded over the target months
and ex ante expected returns (from the GLS projections). In contrast, since no
estimation of optimal portfolio weights is involved, the ex ante volatility of the
market indexing strategy is likely to be a good estimate of its ex post volatility.
Consequently, we suspected that the ex post volatility of our price-contingent
strategy may be much higher than that of the market portfolio, even if volatili-
ties matched ex ante. The data confirmed our suspicion.
To accommodate estimation error, one could directly adjust estimates of the
ex ante volatilities of the price-contingent strategy. The necessary adjustments
are rather involved, and unfortunately, they require additional assumptions on
the data-generating process that reduce the robustness of the inference (e.g.,
the projection errors are jointly normal and independent over time).22
21 Since the error terms in the return–price projections will be correlated, one may want to use seemingly unrelated
regressions (SUR). Because the regressors are the same for each of the six projections, however, SUR boils down
to ordinary least squares.
22 For an in-depth analysis, see, for example, Kandel and Stambaugh (1996).
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Instead, we correct for estimation error by matching ex post volatilities, as
is often done in finance.23 In particular, we determine the right combination
of our price-contingent strategy with investment in the market portfolio that
generates the same ex post volatility as the index.24 With our return history, a
50–50 combination ensures that variances are matched. As a result, in the per-
formance evaluation to follow, we will compare the returns of two strategies:
(i) a strategy that constantly reinvests 50% in our optimal price-contingent
portfolio and 50% in the market portfolio and (ii) 100% market indexing.
These two strategies generated approximately the same ex post volatility over
the period July 1927 to December 2000.
For brevity, we will refer in the sequel to the 50–50 combination of the opti-
mal price-contingent portfolio and the market as our price-contingent strategy.
But bear in mind that it in fact mixes indexing with optimal price-contingent
investing.
2.5 Performance evaluation
To evaluate the performance of the optimal price-contingent strategy, we com-
pare its Sharpe ratio to that of the index. For each month t , we compute the
average return of the price-contingent portfolio as a sixty-month moving aver-
age centered on t . We proceed similarly for the index. We estimate the volatil-
ity of the index as the mean squared difference between its return and that
predicted by the GLS regression. The difference between the Sharpe ratios of
the two portfolios is estimated as the difference between the two average re-
turns, divided by the volatility of the index. We use the same denominator for
the two Sharpe ratios, since the price-contingent strategy is constructed to have
the same volatility as the index.
To complement this comparison of Sharpe ratios and evaluate the statistical
significance of the outperformance, we use a z-test. Its intuition can be sum-
marized as follows: We compute the average difference between the returns on
the price-contingent portfolio and the index; we divide it by the standard devi-
ation of this difference; we scale up this ratio by the square root of the number
of observations. Relying on the functional central limit theorem, we compute
a confidence interval.25 More precisely, we compute partial z-statistics as fol-
lows. Let r tC denote the return on the CRSP over month t . Let r
t
P denote the
month-t return on our price-contingent portfolio. For a sample that starts at T1
and ends at T2, the partial z-statistics are computed from the partial sums of
23 See, for example, Cochrane (1999), Figure 6.
24 Cochrane (1999) compares the performance of indexing against that of alternative strategies by combining the
latter with investment in Treasury bills. In contrast, we combine our price-contingent strategy with investment
in the market portfolio.
25 See Bossaerts (1995) for an earlier illustration of the use of partial z-statistics.
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the difference between the return on the price-contingent portfolio and that on
the index:
zT1,T2,t =
1√
T2 − T1
t∑
τ=T1+1
r τP − r τC
σ
.
We estimate σ as
σˆ =
√√√√ 1
T
T∑
τ=1
{r τP − r τC }2.
This is a (heteroscedasticity-consistent) estimate of the standard deviation
of the return differences, under the null that the expected return differences
equal 0.26
The partial z-statistics form a stochastic process on [T1, T2], so they are easy
to visualize. The functional central limit theorem predicts that, in large samples
(meaning T2 − T1 → ∞),
zT1,T2,t ∼ W (
t − T1
T2 − T1 ),
where W denotes a standard Brownian motion on [0, 1]. Note that the usual
z-statistic over [T1, T2] has t = T2 and hence zT1,T2,T2 ∼ W (1), that is, its
asymptotic distribution is standard normal, in accordance with the usual central
limit theorem. Confidence bands of 95% can readily be computed as
±1.97
√
t − T1
T2 − T1 .
We provide plots of the partial z-statistics for T1 = 0 (before the start of our
sampling period, i.e., June 1927), and T2 = T (the end of our sampling pe-
riod, namely, December 2000). That is, we report z0,T,t . In that case, the 95%
confidence intervals are given by
±1.97
√
t
T
.
26 Results do not change qualitatively if σˆ is computed without the assumption that the expected return differences
equal 0.
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One can compute confidence intervals starting at any T1 > 0 and conditional
on the partial z-statistic at that point, z0,T,T1 . These derive from the fact that27
z0,T,t − z0,T,T1 = zT1,T,t
√
T − T1
T
∼ W ( t − T1
T − T1 )
√
T − T1
T
(T1 < t ≤ T ). Hence, the confidence interval starting T1 and conditional on
z0,T,T1 equals
z0,T,T1 ± 1.97
√
t − T1
T
.
We plot such conditional confidence intervals at ten-year intervals.
3. Empirical Results
3.1 Main results
The main results are displayed in Figures 4 and 5. The average return on our
price-contingent strategy is 1.4% per month (18% on an annual basis); that of
the market portfolio is 1.2% (15% on an annual basis). The ex post standard
deviation on both portfolios is 21% per year. Figure 4 shows the evolution
of the difference in Sharpe ratio between the optimal price-contingent port-
folio and the CRSP index. The average difference in Sharpe ratios is 0.048.
Our price-contingent strategy thus adds substantially to the achievable return.
Figure 4 demonstrates that, with the exception of a few subperiods, our price-
contingent optimal strategy outperforms the CRSP index consistently since the
beginning of the sampling period.
Figure 5 displays the evolution of the partial z-statistic. It confirms that the
outperformance was significant. Consider the evolution of the z-statistic from
the beginning of the sample period (1927) to its end (2000). The square-root
function depicts the confidence bounds. The z-statistic crosses the confidence
bound, indicating significant outperformance, as soon as the 1930s. The final
value of the statistic, at the end of the sample, reaches a highly significant value
of 2.7 (p < 0.001). The gradual increase in the z-statistic indicates that the out-
performance of the price-contingent strategy is not the effect of a few outliers.
Figure 5 also enables the reader to check the significance of the outperfor-
mance of the price-contingent strategy for any of the decades in our sample:
1932–1942, 1942–1952, ..., 1982–1992, 1992–2000. The z-statistic is positive
27 The functional central limit theorem predicts that the asymptotic behavior of the partial z-statistic is that of the
standard Brownian motion. This means not only that partial z-statistics are normally distributed (one could have
derived that from a standard central limit theorem) but also, more importantly, that increments are independent.
It is precisely this independence that allows us to “re-start” the confidence intervals at any T1 > 0 as if a new,
independent sample was produced.
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Performance results
Evolution of the difference between the Sharpe ratios of (i) a strategy with 50% in the CRSP value-weighted
index (the market index) and 50% in the optimal price-contingent portfolio whereby the return–prices relation-
ship is estimated from the sixty months prior to the target month [weights change as a function of (a) expected
returns based on relative prices and the estimated price–return relationship and (b) corresponding prediction
error variances; the ex ante volatility of this portfolio is the same as that of the market index] and (ii) the market
index, July 1927 to December 2000. The two strategies generate the same ex post volatility. The difference in
Sharpe ratios is estimated on the basis of a moving, fixed-length window of sixty months centered around the
target month.
at the end of the decade in all but one ten-year subperiod; the corresponding
p-level is 0.06.28 The performance is significant at the 5% level in two out of
seven ten-year subperiods; the corresponding p-level is about 0.05.29 That is,
there is little doubt about the significance of the outperformance.
Thus we find that our price-contingent allocation strategy significantly out-
performs the index. This is consistent with our noisy rational expectations
model, where prices reflect economically relevant information, while at the
same time not fully revealing all of it.
28 This p-level is based on a simple binomial test evaluating the probability of at least x positive outcomes (perfor-
mance) in n independent trials (periods) when the probability of a positive outcome is 0.5. In the above, x = 6
and n = 7.
29 This p-level is based on a simple binomial test evaluating the probability of at least x rejections in n independent
trials (periods) when the probability of a rejection is 0.05. In the above, x = 2 and n = 7.
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Statistical tests
Evolution of the partial z-statistic of the difference in return between (i) a strategy with 50% in the CRSP
value-weighted index (the market index) and 50% in the optimal price-contingent portfolio whereby the return–
prices relationship is estimated from the sixty months prior to the target month [weights change as a function of
(a) expected returns based on relative prices and the estimated price–return relationship and (b) corresponding
prediction error variances; the ex ante volatility of this portfolio is the same as that of the market index] and (ii)
the market index, July 1927 to December 2000. The two strategies generate the same ex post volatility. Strategy
(i) outperforms strategy (ii) when the partial z-statistic is positive; the performance is significantly different from
0 in a given ten-year period if the partial z-statistic moves outside the 95% confidence region bounded by the
square-root function anchored at the beginning of the ten-year period.
3.2 Perspective
To build perspective, we now compare the performance of our price-contingent
strategy to that of alternative strategies, which have been claimed to improve
upon indexing: the size, value, and momentum strategies (e.g., Cochrane 1999;
Cooper, Gutierrez, and Marcum 2005; Davis, Fama, and French 2000; Fama
and French 1996; Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok 1996; Lewellen 2002).
The size strategy exploits the difference between the returns of small firms
and those of large firms. The standard portfolio that implements this strategy
is a zero-investment strategy, taking a long position in small firms and a short
position in large firms. It is referred to as the Fama–French “small minus big”
(SMB) portfolio.30 Analogously, the value strategy exploits the difference be-
tween the returns of firms with high book value of equity relative to market
30 Historical monthly returns of SMB and HML (referred to later) can be retrieved from Ken French’s Web site;
these were used in the present study.
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value and firms with low book-to-market ratio. It is a zero-investment portfo-
lio taking a long position in high-value firms, while shorting low-value firms.
It is referred to as the Fama–French “high minus low” (HML) portfolio. The
momentum strategy exploits persistence in stock returns. It establishes a long
position in recent winners while shorting recent losers. Usually, a twelve-
month window is considered to determine if stocks have been winners or
losers. Portfolio weights are proportional to the difference between the return
over the previous twelve months relative to the average performance.
Note that these are zero-investment strategies, not portfolios. Therefore, re-
turns are not defined for these strategies (computing returns would involve
dividing by 0), and it is impossible to position them directly in a mean–return/
variance space.31 To be able to measure returns and analyze mean–variance
efficiency, Cochrane (1999) combines these zero-investment strategies with the
risk-free asset. This gives rise to portfolios, with well-defined returns, which
can be cumulated over time. Furthermore, to control for risk, Cochrane (1999)
designs these portfolios to match their volatility with that of the index. We
follow the approach in Cochrane (1999), but we combine the SMB, HML, and
momentum strategy with the index, instead of the risk-free asset.32 Since SMB,
HML, and the momentum portfolio are zero-investment portfolios, combining
them with the index amounts to adjusting standard market portfolio weights.
For instance, investing in the market plus SMB translates into over-weighing
small firms and under-weighing large firms (relative to the index).
Of these strategies, the combination of the index and a momentum portfolio
comes closest in spirit to our price-contingent strategy, because both exploit
information in past returns. As shown in Section 1, the momentum effect is
perfectly consistent with our theoretical framework. It is, however, a secondary
effect, which means that the momentum strategy should not outperform our
price-contingent strategy when evaluated in mean–variance space. The rela-
tionship between our price-contingent strategy and size and value investing
is less clear, because there is no role for firm size or book value of assets
in our theoretical framework. To the extent that size and value are secondary
effects, enhancement of indexing by skewing weights toward small firms or
high book-to-market value ratios should not lead to outperformance relative to
our price-contingent strategy.
Figure 6 compares the performance of the price-contingent, size, value, and
momentum portfolios. We plot the evolution of the wealth of an investor start-
ing on June 30, 1932, with $1 and investing according to one of five possi-
ble strategies. The five strategies were constructed to have the same ex post
monthly return volatility over the period of July 1932 to December 2000.
31 This problem did not arise in our numerical analysis above, where, in line with our CARA–normal model, we
considered dollar returns, as opposed to percentage returns.
32 When combining the zero-investment strategies with the risk-free asset only, the combinations generated inferior
performance. Thus, our choice to combine with the market index effectively stacks the deck against finding
evidence that the price-contingent strategy outperforms strategies based on size, value, or momentum.
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Performance comparison
Wealth evolution from investing $1 on June 30, 1932, and monthly reinvesting returns, various strategies (natural
log scale). All strategies generated the same (ex post) volatility over the period July 1932 to December 2002.
The strategies are (i) indexing (solid line; 100% investment in the CRSP value-weighted index [the market
portfolio]); (ii) indexing with size enhancement (dash-dotted line; 95% investment in the market portfolio, plus
20% invested in the Fama–French SMB zero-investment portfolio and 5% in three-month Treasury bills; the
SMB portfolio is long small firms and short large firms); (iii) indexing with value enhancement (dashed line;
95% investment in the market portfolio, plus 25% invested in the Fama–French HML zero-investment portfolio
and 5% in three-month Treasury bills; the HML portfolio is long firms with high book-to-market value ratio
and short firms with low book-to-market value ratio); (iv) indexing with momentum enhancement (dotted line;
95% investment in the market portfolio, plus 20% invested in the standard zero-investment momentum portfolio
and 5% in three-month Treasury bills; the momentum portfolio is long recent winners and short recent losers
among the six FF benchmark portfolios; winners and losers are determined by the return over the previous twelve
months relative to the average); (v) our price-contingent strategy (heavy solid line; 50% in the market portfolio
and 50% in an optimal price-contingent portfolio, as explained in the captions of Figures 4 and 5).
Hence, the ordering in mean–variance space can be readily inferred from the
relative wealth levels that the strategies generate. The five strategies are as
follows.
1. Indexing: The investor holds the CRSP value-weighted index throughout
the 68.5-year period.
2. Indexing with size enhancement: The investor invests 95% in the index and
5% in three-month Treasury bills, adding 0.2 units of the (zero-investment)
Fama–French SMB portfolio for every dollar invested in the index and
re-balancing at the end of each month.
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3. Indexing with value enhancement: The investor invests 95% in the index
and 5% in three-month Treasury bills, adding 0.25 units of the (zero-
investment) Fama–French HML portfolio for every dollar invested in the
index and re-balancing at the end of each month.
4. Indexing with momentum enhancement: The investor invests 95% in the
index and 5% in three-month Treasury bills, adding 0.2 units of a momen-
tum portfolio for every dollar invested in the index and re-balancing at the
end of each month. The (zero-investment) momentum portfolio invests in
each of the six FF benchmark portfolios in proportion to the return they
generated over the previous twelve months relative to the average return.
5. Price-contingent strategy: The investor puts 50% of wealth in the index
and 50% in the optimal price-contingent strategy with the same ex ante
volatility as the index; the portfolio is re-balanced monthly.
The portfolio structures in strategies 2 to 5 are designed to ensure that the
(ex post) variance of the portfolio matches that of the index. While the price-
contingent portfolio is simply combined with the index, the size, value, and
momentum portfolios are also combined with Treasury bills (for 5% of the
portfolio). This was necessary to match their volatility with that of the index.
The SMB, HML, and momentum portfolios have virtually zero correlation
with the market (as also found by Cochrane 1999). Hence, simply adding these
zero-investment portfolios to the market would have increased the volatility of
the portfolio above that of the index. To offset this increase, 5% of the wealth
is invested in Treasury bills.33 In contrast, it was not necessary to include the
risk-free asset in the price-contingent strategy to match its volatility with that
of the index.
Figure 6 confirms the performance of the value and momentum strategies.
Combining the market portfolio with the Fama–French HML portfolio im-
proves indexing; a combination with the momentum portfolio does even better.
The standard t-statistics for the outperformance of the size, value, momen-
tum, and price-contingent portfolios relative to the market are −0.45, 1.46,
2.14, and 2.66, respectively. Figure 6 also illustrates that the price-contingent
strategy outperforms the four alternatives. Even compared to the best alterna-
tive (i.e., the momentum strategy), the outperformance of the price-contingent
strategy is marginally significant (the t-statistic for the difference between the
performance of these two strategies is 1.88; p < 0.05).
The reader may wonder why we did not rely on an approach that has be-
come standard in finance: Fama and French regressions. The two approaches
are analogous. We compare the performance of identically risky portfolios, re-
lying on Sharpe ratios and cumulated returns. Fama and French regressions test
whether some combination of the index and the value or size strategies outper-
forms the index. But our test is more specific since we ask whether a particular
33 Treasury bill return data are from CRSP.
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portfolio rather than “some combination of FF factors” outperforms the index.
Furthermore, the specific portfolio we consider is suggested by theory and is
constructed using only ex ante information.
3.3 The nature of the return–price relationship
In principle, the return–price relationships that are at the heart of the success
of our price-contingent strategy can be rather counter-intuitive. For instance,
as shown in Admati (1985, Section 4, pp. 641–46), it is possible that a rel-
atively high price for a given asset be associated with a relatively low rate
of return. All depends on the correlation structure between the payoffs in the
multi-asset economy. The pattern of correlations thus arising is much more
complex and richer than the simple pattern of continuations upon which the
momentum strategy relies.
To document this point, we estimated the partial correlation between a port-
folio’s return and its own price. Below is a list of the average slope coefficients
in the GLS projections of the returns of the six FF benchmark portfolios onto
prices.34 We only report the slope coefficient corresponding to a portfolio’s
own price. Each sixty-month estimation period prior to a target month gener-
ates one estimate. The sample standard deviation of the estimated slope coef-
ficients is reported in parentheses. We only report results from nonoverlapping
sixty-month periods.35 The FF benchmark portfolios are identified as holding
stock in big (B), small (S), high-value (H), medium-value (M), or low-value
firms (L).
BL BM BH SL SM SH
−0.51 0.84 −1.53 −2.01 −0.47 −5.47
(0.25) (0.60) (0.77) (1.27) (1.00) (1.69)
The (partial) correlation between a portfolio’s return and its own price tends
to be negative, especially for firms with extremely high or low book-to-market
value ratios. Again, this points to the difference between the price-contingent
strategy and the momentum strategy.
3.4 The structure of the price-contingent portfolio
To better document the nature of the optimal price-contingent strategy, we also
computed the average weight it places on the six Fama and French portfolios.
To obtain these numbers, we took the weights placed by the optimal price-
contingent strategy on each of the six portfolios for each month in our sam-
ple. We then averaged these weights across months. The average weights are
34 These GLS projections were the inputs of our optimal price-contingent portfolio strategy.
35 The results are not sensitive to the choice of series of nonoverlapping sixty-month periods.
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reported in the next table. For the sake of comparison, the table also reports the
structure of the portfolio of the six Fama and French portfolios that best repli-
cated the index during our sample period. When considering these numbers,
one should bear in mind that they are averages, around which actual weights
fluctuate significantly throughout the sample period.
BL BM BH SL SM SH
Price-contingent strategy 0.525 0.435 0.035 −0.490 0.555 −0.055
Index replication 0.580 0.270 0.070 0.050 0.030 0.000
The table shows that the optimal price-contingent strategy places a lot of
weight on big capitalization stocks with a low ratio of book-to-market value.
This is approximately in line with the weight placed on those stocks by the
portfolio replicating the index. In contrast, the optimal price-contingent strat-
egy involves shorting small capitalization stocks with a low ratio of book-
to-market value. This departs markedly from the portfolio replicating the
index. The price-contingent strategy also places a relatively large weight on
the medium value stocks, be they small or big capitalization stocks. Finally,
like the portfolio replicating the index, it places negligible weight on high-
value small stocks. In line with the results presented in Sections 3.2 and 3.3,
these figures illustrate that the optimal price-contingent strategy differs from
the size and value strategies.
4. Conclusion
This article studies the implications of information asymmetry for equilibrium
asset pricing and portfolio choice. In our dynamic multi-asset rational expec-
tations model, prices are only partially revealing because the demand of in-
formed investors reflects their random endowment shocks, along with their
signals. Equilibrium prices are set as in a representative agent economy where
the market portfolio would include the aggregate risky endowment shock and
the beliefs of the representative agent would average those of the informed and
the uninformed. This pricing relation cannot be directly tested since the beliefs
of the representative agent are not observable to the econometrician. On the
other hand, the information set of the econometrician is comparable to that of
some agents in the model: the uninformed agents with no endowment shocks.
We implement empirically the optimal portfolio strategy implied by our theory
for these agents. Thus we construct their conditional mean–variance optimal
portfolio. Consistent with our theory, we find that it outperforms the index both
economically and statistically.
There is still ample scope for improving the performance of price-contingent
strategies. Our results are based on rather crude groupings of stocks. Less
aggregate groupings should be contemplated, as well as other groupings
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(e.g., industry-based portfolios).36 Our estimation of the correlation between
returns and prices is based on simple linear GLS. We did not investigate more
sophisticated specifications or estimation strategies, such as nonlinear least
squares or conditional heteroscedasticity. No attempt was made to estimate the
optimal window size on which to estimate the correlation between prices and
returns. Refining the statistical analysis along those and other lines may yield
more powerful information extraction and consequently superior performance.
The significant outperformance we uncover suggests that the price-
contingent investment approach is a valuable complement to fundamental and
quantitative investment analysis. It should be emphasized that our results are
out of sample, so that the outperformance we obtain is based on information
that was available to the investors at the time portfolio allocation decisions had
to be made. Our results suggest that value can be created not only in traditional
ways, by designing optimal portfolios (quantitative investment analysis) or
estimating cash flows (fundamental investment analysis), but also by studying
price formation in the marketplace and using the results to infer information
about future returns that only competitors observe directly. Our setting pro-
vides a reconciliation between the philosophies of active and passive portfolio
management as investors tilt their portfolios in favor of the assets for which
they are particularly optimistic and in that sense follow active strategies.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. The market-clearing condition is
γ (x + zt )=λτy{E[ f t+1+ pt+1|yt ]−(1 + r)pt }+(1−λ)τp{E[ f t+1+ pt+1|pt ]−(1 + r)pt }.
Thus,
τp
E[ f t+1 + pt+1|pt ] − (1 + r)pt
γ
= (x + zt ) − λ
γ
[τy{E[ f t+1 + pt+1|yt ] − (1 + r)pt }
− τp{E[ f t+1 + pt+1|pt ] − (1 + r)pt }].
Noting that the left-hand side of this inequality is equal to the demand of the uninformed agent,
we obtain the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 3. By the projection theorem,
E[ f t+1 + pt+1|pt ] = E( f t+1 + pt+1) + Cov( f t+1 + pt+1, pt )(V ar(pt ))−1(pt − E(pt )).
36 Jimenez Garcia (2004) offers an interesting empirical analysis of asset pricing under private information, relying
on industry groupings.
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Substituting the conjectured price function (3) and the recursive definition of f t+1 and zt+1
(Equations (2) and (1), respectively) into this conditional expectation,
E[ f t+1 + pt+1|pt ]
= μ + ρ f f t + E[A f t+1 + Byt+1 − Czt+1 − Dzt + G]
+ Cov(ρ f f t + tf + A f t+1 + Byt+1 − Czt+1 − Dzt , A f t + Byt − Czt − Dzt−1)
× (V ar(A f t + Byt − Czt − Dzt−1))−1
× [pt − E(pt )].
Denote ψ = I + A + Bρ f . The intercept simplifies to
(I + A)μ + (I + A)ρ f f t + E[Byt+1 − (Cρz + D)zt ] + G
= (I + A)μ + ψρ f f t − (Cρz + D)ρz zt−1 + G + B(I + ρ f )μ.
The slope becomes
Cov(ρ f f t + tf + A(ρ f f t + tf ) + Byt+1 − C(ρz zt + t+1z ) − Dzt ),
A f t + Byt − C(ρz zt−1 + tz) − Dzt−1)
×
(
V ar(A f t + Byt − Czt − Dzt−1)
)−1
.
Now, at time t , f t and zt−1 are known, hence the slope simplifies to
Cov((I + A)tf + Byt+1 − C(ρz zt + t+1z ) − Dzt , Byt − Ctz) × (V ar(Byt − Czt ))−1.
Substituting the recursive equation for z and y, after some simplifications, we get that
Cov( f t+1 + pt+1, pt )(V ar(pt ))−1
=
(
ψV ar(tf )B
′ + (Cρz + D)V ar(tz)C ′
) (
BV ar(tf + t )B′ + CV ar(tz)C ′
)−1
.
(A1)
Finally,
E[pt ] = E(A f t + Byt − Czt − Dzt−1) + G = (ψ − I ) f t − (Cρz + D)zt−1 + G + Bμ.
Putting all this together, the conditional expectation of the uninformed agents is
E[ f t+1 + pt+1|pt ]
= (ψ + B)μ + ψρ f f t − (Cρz + D)ρz zt−1 + G
+
{
ψV ar(tf )B
′ + (Cρz + D)V ar(tz)C ′
}
× [pt − (ψ − I ) f t + (Cρz + D)zt−1 − G − Bμ]
×
(
BV ar(tf + t )B′ + CV ar(tz)C ′
)−1
.
For the informed agent, by the projection theorem,
E[ f t+1 + pt+1|yt ] = E[ f t+1 + pt+1] + Cov( f t+1 + pt+1, yt ) (V ar(yt ))−1 [yt − E(yt )].
The intercept is the same as for the uninformed agent. Now,
Cov( f t+1 + pt+1, yt ) = ψ, (A2)
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and
V ar(yt )−1 = V ar(tf )V ar(tf + t )−1. (A3)
After some manipulation, the slope simplifies to (I + A + Bρ f )V ar(tf )
(
V ar(tf + t )
)−1
.
Also, E(yt ) = μ + ρ f f t . Thus the conditional expectation for the informed agents is
E[ f t+1 + pt+1|yt ]
= (I + A)μ + ψρ f f t − (Cρz + D)ρz zt−1 + G + B(I + ρ f )μ
+ ψV ar(tf )
(
V ar(tf + t )
)−1 [yt − μ − ρ f f t ].
Putting these results together, the price equation becomes
pt (1 + r)
= (I + A)μ + ψρ f f t − (Cρz + D)ρz zt−1 + G + B(I + ρ f )μ
+ ωψV ar(tf )(V ar(tf + t ))−1[yt − μ − ρ f f t ]
+ (I − ω)[ψV ar(tf )B′ + (Cρz + D)V ar(tz)C ′]
×
(
BV ar(tf + t )B′ + CV ar(tz)C ′
)−1
×[pt − (ψ − I ) f t + (Cρz + D)zt−1 − G − Bμ]
− γ (λτy + (1 − λ)τp)−1(x + zt ).
Denote
 = (1 + r)I − [I − (λτy + (1 − λ)τp)−1λτy ]
[ψV ar(tf )B′ + (Cρz + D)V ar(tz)C ′][BV ar(tf + t )B′ + CV ar(tz)C ′]−1. (A4)
The price equation can be rewritten as
pt
= {[(I + A) + Bρ f − ωψV ar(tf )(V ar(tf + t ))−1]ρ f
−(I − ω)[ψV ar(tf )B′ + (Cρz + D)V ar(tz)C ′]
×
(
BV ar(tf + t )B′ + CV ar(tz)C ′
)−1
(ψ − I )} f t
+{ωψV ar(tf )(V ar(tf + t ))−1}yt
−{γ (λτy + (1 − λ)τp)−1}zt
−{(Cρz + D)ρz
−(I − ω)[ψV ar(tf )B′ + (Cρz + D)V ar(tz)C ′]
×
(
BV ar(tf + t )B′ + CV ar(tz)C ′
)−1
(Cρz + D)}zt−1
−(I − ω)[ψV ar(tf )B′ + (Cρz + D)V ar(tz)C ′]
×
(
BV ar(tf + t )B′ + CV ar(tz)C ′
)−1
(G + Bμ)
+G + (ψ + B)μ − ω(I + A + Bρ f )V ar(tf )(V ar(tf + t ))−1μ
−γ (λτy + (1 − λ)τp)−1x .
1537
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article-abstract/23/4/1503/1592566
by guest
on 20 February 2018
The Review of Financial Studies / v 23 n 4 2010
The conditional precision of the information of the informed agent is
(τy)
−1 = V ar( f t+1 + pt+1) − Cov( f t+1 + pt+1, yt ) (V ar(yt ))−1 Cov( f t+1 + pt+1, yt )′.
The first term is
V ar( f t+1 + pt+1) = ψV ar(tf )ψ ′ + B[V ar(tf ) + V ar(t+1)]B′
+ [Cρz + D]V ar(tz)[Cρz + D]′ + CV ar(tz)C ′. (A5)
Substituting from Equations (A2), (A3), and (A5),
(τy)
−1 = ψV ar(tf )ψ ′ + BV ar [(tf ) + V ar(t+1)]B
+ [Cρz + D]V ar(tz)[Cρz + D]′ + CV ar(tz)C ′
− ψV ar(tf )
(
V ar(tf + t )
)−1
V ar(tf )
′ψ ′. (A6)
The conditional precision of the information of the uninformed agent is
(τp)
−1 = V ar( f t+1 + pt+1) − Cov( f t+1 + pt+1, pt ) (V ar(pt ))−1 Cov( f t+1 + pt+1, pt )′.
Substituting from Equations (A1) and (A5), we get
(τp)
−1 = ψV ar(tf )ψ ′ + B[V ar(tf ) + V ar(t+1)]B′ + [Cρz + D]V ar(tz)[Cρz + D]′
+ CV ar(tz)C ′ − {ψV ar(tf )B′ + (Cρz + D)V ar(tz)C ′}
× {BV ar(tf + t )B′ + CV ar(tz)C ′}
× {ψV ar(tf )B′ + (Cρz + D)V ar(tz)C ′}′. (A7)
Identifying the price function resulting from the market-clearing condition with the conjectured
price function, one gets the following system of equations:
A = [(ψ − ωψV ar(tf )(V ar(tf + t ))−1]ρ f
− (I − ω)[ψV ar(tf )B′ + (Cρz + D)V ar(tz)C ′]
×
(
BV ar(tf + t )B′ + CV ar(tz)C ′
)−1
(A + Bρ f ). (A8)
B = ωψV ar(tf )(V ar(tf + t ))−1. (A9)
C = γ (λτy + (1 − λ)τp)−1. (A10)
D = (Cρz + D)ρz
− (I − ω)[ψV ar(tf )B′ + (Cρz + D)V ar(tz)C ′]
×
(
BV ar(tf + t )B′ + CV ar(tz)C ′
)−1
(Cρz + D). (A11)
− G = (I − ω)[ψV ar(tf )B′ + (Cρz + D)V ar(tz)C ′]
×
(
BV ar(tf + t )B′ + CV ar(tz)C ′
)−1
(G + Bμ)
− (G + (ψ + B)μ) + ωψV ar(tf )(V ar(tf + t ))−1μ
+ γ (λτy + (1 − λ)τp)−1x . (A12)
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Note that Equation (A10) directly yields the expression for C in Proposition 3. To simplify this
system of equations, we rely on the following lemma:
Lemma 1. ψ = [I − (1 + r)−1ρ f ]−1.37
Proof of Lemma 1. From Equation (A8) and the definition of , we have that A = −1{[ψ −
ωψV ar(tf )(V ar(
t
f + t ))−1]ρ f + [ − (1 + r)I ](ψ − I )}. Combining this with Equation
(A9), we obtain that I + A + Bρ f = I + −1{ψρ f + [ − (1 + r)I ](ψ − I )}, which, after
some simplifications, yields the result. 
Substituting ψ from Lemma 1 and ω in Equation (A9), we obtain the expression for B in
Proposition 3. Noting that −−1(I − ω) = I − (1 + r)−1−1 and substituting ψ and ω into
Equation (A11), we obtain the expression for D in Proposition 3. Substituting ψ from Lemma 1
in τp and τy from Equations (A6) and (A7), we get ω, τp , and τy as functions of the exogenous
parameters and B, C , and D, as stated in Proposition 3. Similarly, substituting , ψ , ω , τp , and
τy into Equations (A8) and (A12), we get A and G as functions of B, C , and D, as stated in
Proposition 3. 
Proof of Corollary 1. To establish that the price function stated in the corollary is an equilib-
rium price, we substitute the linear price function in the market-clearing condition and check
that the equality holds for the coefficients stated in Corollary 1. Substituting pt = A f t + G
into pt = (1 + r)−1{E(pt+1 + f t+1) − γ τ−1x} yields A f t + G = (1 + r)−1{E(A f t+1 +
G + f t+1) − γ τ−1x}. That is, A f t + G = (1 + r)−1{(I + A)(μ + ρ f f t ) + G − γ τ−1x}. Or
[(1 + r)A − (I + A)ρ f ] f t = −rG + (I + A)μ − γ τ−1x . For this to hold for each realization
of f t , we need that (1 + r)A − (I + A)ρ f = 0 and rG = +(I + A)μ − γ τ−1x . This directly
yields the coefficients stated in Corollary 1. 
Proof of Corollary 2. Substituting the price function (3) and the recursive definition of f t+1 (2)
into the return Equation (8) yields Rt+1 = (I + A)μ + ((A + I )ρ f − A) f t + (A + I )tf . With
ex ante identical and independent dividend processes, the coefficient matrix A is diagonal with
common diagonal element a¯(> 0). For the nth asset, the (unconditional) return autocovariance
Cov(Rt+1n , Rtn) equals
Cov(((a¯ + 1)ρ¯ f − a¯)(ρ f f t−1n + t−1f,n ) + (a¯ + 1)tf,n , ((a¯ + 1)ρ¯ f − a¯) f t−1n + (a¯ + 1)t−1f,n ).
Now, in this simple case, we have a¯ = ρ¯ f (1 + r − ρ¯ f )−1, so
(a¯ + 1)ρ¯ f − a¯ = 1 + r1 + r − ρ¯ f ρ¯ f −
ρ¯ f
1 + r − ρ¯ f =
r ρ¯ f
1 + r − ρ¯ f .
Hence the covariance Cov(Rt+1n , Rtn) is
(
r ρ¯ f
1 + r − ρ¯ f
)2
ρ¯ f V ar
(
f t−1n
)
+
(
r ρ¯ f
1 + r − ρ¯ f
)(
1 + r
1 + r − ρ¯ f
)
V ar
(
t−1f,n
)
> 0.
Now turn to the momentum strategy. Let M denote the (unconditional) expected return on
asset n. Let μ¯ denote the nth element of μ (they are all the same, so we drop the subscript n),
37 We thank the referee for suggesting this result.
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and denote M = E[Rt+1n ]. The position in asset n equals (1/N )(Rtn − R¯t ). The return on the
momentum portfolio equals
1
N
(Rt − R¯t 1)′ Rt+1 = 1
N
(Rt − M1)′ Rt+1 − 1
N
(R¯t − M)1′ Rt+1.
As N → ∞, the second term on the right-hand side converges to 0 (based on the principle that if a
sequence of random variables X N converges in probability to 0 and another one YN converges in
probability to Y , then X N YN converges in probability to 0 as well). So, we only need to investigate
the first term:
E
[
1
N
(Rt − M1)′ Rt+1
]
= 1
N
N∑
n=1
Cov(Rt+1n , Rtn) > 0. 
Proof of Corollary 3. With random endowment shocks and no private information, the linear
price function is pt = A f t − Czt + G, and Proposition 3 yields A = ρ f [(1 + r)I − ρ f ]−1, C =
γ
1+r τ−1, G = r−1[(I + A)μ − γ τ−1x], and τ−1 = [I + A]′V ar(tf )[I + A] + CV ar(tz)C ′.
Substituting for A and C in the latter equation, we obtain
τ−1 = [I + ρ f [(1 + r)I − ρ f ]−1]′V ar(tf )[I + ρ f [(1 + r)I − ρ f ]−1]
+ γ
1 + r τ
−1V ar(tz)(
γ
1 + r τ
−1)′.
Substituting ρ f = ρ¯ f I , V ar(z) = σ 2z I , and V ar( f ) = σ 2f I , this rewrites as
τ−1 =
(
I + ρ¯ f I
(
(1 + r)I − ρ¯ f I
)−1)′
σ 2f I
(
I + ρ¯ f I
(
(1 + r)I − ρ¯ f I
)−1)
+
(
γ
1 + r τ
−1
)′
σ 2z I
(
γ
1 + r τ
−1
)
. (A13)
That is,
τ−1 =
[
1 + ρ¯ f
(1 + r) − ρ¯ f
]2
σ 2f I +
[
γ
1 + r
]2
σ 2z (τ
−1)′τ−1. (A14)
To solve the equilibrium, we must study if Equation (A14) admits a solution and, if it does, find
its roots. Denote
α =
[
γ
1 + r
]2
σ 2z and β =
[
1 + ρ¯ f
(1 + r) − ρ¯ f
]2
σ 2f =
[
1 + r
1 + r − ρ¯ f
]2
σ 2f ,
and τ−1 = Q. Equation (A14) writes as
aQ′Q − Q + bI = 0. (A15)
Since Q is a symmetric matrix, it can be written as Q = VV ′,where V is the matrix of eigen-
vectors and  the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues. So we can rewrite Equation (A15) as
α(VV ′)′VV ′ − VV ′ + β I = 0. (A16)
Note that V is also the eigenvector matrix of I , that is, V I V ′ = V V ′ = I . Note also that V = V ′
since V is symmetric. Thus, Equation (A16) is equivalent to
αV′V ′VV ′ − VV ′ + β I = V (α′)V ′ − VV ′ + Vβ I V ′ = 0. (A17)
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Thus we can rewrite this equation as
V (a′ −  + bI )V ′ = 0. (A18)
Equation (A18) can be rewritten as
V PV ′ = 0, (A19)
where P is the diagonal matrix, whose diagonal elements are roots of the quadratic scalar equation:
αl2 − l + β = 0. (A20)
Existence and multiplicity of equilibria will therefore depend on the sign of the discriminant of
this equation:
 = 1 − 4αβ = 1 − 4
[
γ
1 + r − ρ¯ f
]2
σ 2f σ
2
z .
If  is negative, then there is no solution to Equation (A18), and thus there does not exist a linear
rational expectation equilibrium.  is positive iff
1 + r > ρ¯ f − 2γ σ f σz . (A21)
If this inequality holds, then there are two roots to Equation (A18). In that case, there exists
2N possible matrices P that solve Equation (A19). Correspondingly, there are 2N linear rational
expectations equilibria. 
Proof of Corollary 4. Since endowment shocks are not serially correlated, D = 0. In this simple
two-asset case, A, B, and C are 2 × 2 matrices, and G is a 2 × 1 vector. In line with the symmetry
of the distributions of the two assets, we focus on symmetric equilibria where the coefficients are
the same for the two assets in the parameter matrices and vector: A, B, C , and G. We know from
Proposition 3 how A and G can be obtained from B and C , so we focus only on the latter. Since B
is a symmetric matrix, it can be expressed as B = VB V ′, where V is the matrix of eigenvectors
and B the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues:
B =
(
b 0
0 b
)
. (A22)
In the symmetric equilibrium case, the matrices share common eigenvectors. Thus we can write
C = VC V ′, where
C =
(
c 0
0 c
)
(A23)
is the matrix of eigenvalues of C . Similarly, ω = VωV ′ and  = VV ′, where
ω =
(
w 0
0 w
)
(A24)
and
 =
(
φ 0
0 φ
)
. (A25)
Under our distributional assumptions,  simplifies to
 = (1 + r)I − σ 2f (I − ω)ψ B′((σ 2f + σ 2)B B′ + σ 2z CC ′)−1.
Using the decomposition of the matrices in eigenvectors and eigenvalues and Lemma 1 and noting
that V V ′ = I , this yields
VV ′ = (1 + r)V V ′ − σ 2f (V V ′ − VωV ′)
× [I − (1 + r)−1ρ f ]−1VB V ′
((
σ 2f + σ 2
)
B B′ + σ 2z CC ′
)−1
. (A26)
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Note that B B′ = VBB V ′ and CC ′ = VCC V ′. Substituting Equations (A22) and (A23),
we get that
((σ 2f + σ 2)B B′ + σ 2z CC ′)−1 = V
(
((σ 2f + σ 2)b2 + σ 2z c2)−1 0
0 ((σ 2f + σ 2)b2 + σ 2z c2)−1
)
V ′.
Also,
[I − (1 + r)−1ρ f ]−1 = V
(
(1 − ρ f (1 + r)−1)−1 0
0 (1 − ρ f (1 + r)−1)−1
)
V ′
and
V V ′ − VωV ′ = V
(
σ 2f (1 − w) 0
0 σ 2f (1 − w)
)
V ′.
Substituting into Equation (A26), we get that
VV ′ =V
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(1+r)− σ
2f (1−w)b
((σ2f +σ2)b2+σ2z c2)(1−ρ f (1+r)−1)
0
0 (1+r)− σ
2f (1−w)b
((σ2f +σ2)b2+σ2z c2)(1−ρ f (1+r)−1)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ V ′.
Hence,
φ = (1 + r) −
σ 2f (1 − w)b
((σ 2f + σ 2)b2 + σ 2z c2)(1 − ρ f (1 + r)−1)
.
Proceeding similarly, we get the eigenvalues of B, C, w, τy, and τp stated in Corollary 4. 
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